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ST. GEORGE TUCKER’S LECTURE NOTES, THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT, AND ORIGINALIST 





More than two hundred years after the publication of his influential 
edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries, St. George Tucker, the distinguished 
Jeffersonian jurist, is at the center of controversy.  Gun-rights advocates 
claim Tucker as their spiritual forebear, but opponents of this view argue 
that Tucker’s interpretation of the Second Amendment1 can not be pressed 
into service in the modern gun debate without doing great violence to his 
thinking.  The stakes in this intellectual debate have been raised in the wake 
of the Supreme Court’s historic decision in District of Columbia v. Heller.2  
In that decision, two very different interpretations of Tucker’s views of the 
Second Amendment were set out.  Justice Scalia adopted the gun-rights 
view of Tucker and Justice Stevens took the opposing view. One of the cen-
tral points of contention in this modern debate over Tucker arises from the 
learned judge’s earliest discussion of the Second Amendment in his unpub-
lished law lectures.3 
In his essay on Tucker’s lectures, David Hardy claims that Tucker be-
lieved that the Second Amendment enshrined a private right of individual 
self-defense in the Constitution.4  This individual-rights view of the Second 
Amendment was recently affirmed in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in 
Heller.5  Although one might have expected gun-rights advocates to accept 





Professor of History, Ohio State University.  I would like to acknowledge the suggestions and ef-
forts of Jason Allen, Shawn Anderson, Matthew Arnould, Daniel Birk, Dana Brusca, Kristin Feeley, 
Geoffrey King, Anand C. Mathew, and Brianne Straka.  
1
  U.S. CONST. amend. II (link).  
2
  District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (link). 
3
  See St. George Tucker, Ten Notebooks of William and Mary Law Lectures 126–29 (unpublished 
Tucker-Coleman Papers, located at the Earl Gregg Swem Library at The College of William and Mary) 
(copies on file with the Northwestern University Law Review). 
4
  David T. Hardy, The Lecture Notes of St. George Tucker: A Framing Era View of the Bill of 
Rights, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 272 (2008), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/48/ (link). 
5
  Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2799.  For earlier articulations of the same view, see David B. Kopel, The 
Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1359 (link), and Glenn Harlan Rey-
nolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 461–62 (1995) (link). 
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Heller dissents.6  In particular, Hardy takes issue with Justice Stevens’s use 
of a passage from Tucker’s law lectures.7  Tucker argues in that text that the 
Second Amendment was adopted by the First Congress in response to fears 
about federal military power.  In an article in a special issue of the William 
and Mary Law Review commemorating Tucker’s Blackstone, I argued that 
this passage sheds new light on the meaning of his description of the 
Second Amendment as the ―palladium of liberty.‖8  Hardy disagrees, but his 
argument is unconvincing.  He correctly notes that this phrase appears in 
both the law lectures and Tucker’s published View of the Constitution.9  The 
real questions, however, are what did Tucker mean when he described the 
Second Amendment as the ―palladium of liberty,‖ and how does this pas-
sage relate to the one quoted by Stevens?10  Curiously, Hardy does not in-
clude the passage cited by Stevens in his article.  But if one compares the 
text quoted by Stevens with the one Hardy cites in his article and reads both 
passages in light of the Founding era’s own rules for interpreting constitu-
tional texts, it is clear that Tucker’s views do not support either Hardy or 
the Heller majority, but instead support the interpretation of Justice Ste-
vens.  Here are the two discussions of the meaning of the Second Amend-






  Cf. Nelson Lund & David B. Kopel, Unraveling Judicial Restraint: Guns, Abortion, and the Faux 
Conservatism of J. Harvie Wilkinson, III (George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper, Working 
Paper No. 08-61, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1309714 (at-
tacking a critique of Heller by a prominent conservative judge) (link). 
7
  Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2839 n.32 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Hardy, supra note 4, at 278.  Hardy’s ar-
ticle is a classic example of the historical fallacy of argument by tautology.  He claims that because the 
phrase ―palladium of liberty‖ appeared in the law lectures and later in Tucker’s published work, his in-
terpretation of the passage is correct.  Such an argument is circular and tells us nothing about what this 
phrase meant; it merely tells us that the same phrase appears in two places.  For a discussion of historical 
tautologies, see DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL 
THOUGHT 31–34 (1970). 
8
  Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker and the Second Amendment: Original Understandings and Mod-
ern Misunderstandings, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1123, 1125 (2006).   
9
  See ST. GEORGE TUCKER, VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH SELECTED 
WRITINGS 165 (1999) (link). 
10
  For a brief discussion of the various models interpreting the Second Amendment, see Saul Cor-
nell, A New Paradigm for the Second Amendment, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 161, 161 (2004) (link). 
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Table 1: Comparison of Lectures 
 
Passage quoted by Justice Stevens 
in Heller 
Passage quoted by Hardy in the 
Northwestern University Law 
Review Colloquy 
If a State chooses to incur the expence 
of putting arms into the Hands of its 
own Citizens for their defense, it would 
require no small ingenuity to prove that 
they have no right to do it, or that it 
could by any means contravene the Au-
thority of the federal Govt.  It may be 
alleged indeed that this might be done 
for the purpose of resisting the Laws of 
the federal Government, or of shaking 
off the Union: to which the plainest an-
swer seems to be, that whenever the 
States think proper to adopt either of 
these measures, they will not be with-
held by the fear of infringing any of the 
powers of the federal Government.  But 
to contend that such a power would be 
dangerous for the reasons above-
mentioned, would be subversive of 
every principle of Freedom in our Gov-
ernment; of which the first Congress 
appears to have been sensible by pro-
posing an Amendment to the Constitu-
tion, which has since been ratified and 
has become a part of it, viz.  ―That a 
well regulated militia being necessary 
to the Security of a free State, the right 
of the people to keep & bear Arms shall 
not be infringed.‖  To this we may add 
that this power of arming the militia, is 
not one of those prohibited to the States 
by the Constitution, and, consequently, 
is reserved to them under the twelfth ar-
ticle of the ratified Aments.11 
The right of the people to keep and 
bear arms shall not be infringed—
this may be considered as the palla-
dium of liberty.  The right of self 
defense is the first law of nature.  In 
most governments it has been the 
study of rulers to abridge this right 
with the narrowest limits.  Where 
ever standing armies are kept up & 
the right of the people to bear arms 
is by any means or under any colour 
what-soever prohibited, liberty, if 
not already annihilated is in danger 
of being so.—In England the people 
have been disarmed under the spe-
cious pretext of preserving the 
game.  By the alluring idea, the 
landed aristocracy have been 
brought to side with the Court in a 
measure evidently calculated to 
check the effect of any ferment 
which the measures of government 
may produce in the minds of the 
people.——The Game laws are a 
[consolation?] for the government, a 
rattle for the gentry, and a rack for 
the nation.   
[Tucker note: In England the 
right of the people to bear arms is 
confined to protestants—and by the 
terms suitable to their condition & 
degree, the effect of the Declaration 
is entirely done away. Vi: Stat. 1 W 





  Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2839 n.32. 
12
  Hardy, supra note 4, at 278–79. 
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According to Justice Stevens, ―Tucker suggested that the Amendment 
should be understood in the context of the compromise over military power 
represented by the original Constitution and the Second and Tenth Amend-
ments.‖13  Hardy denies that the passage discussed by Stevens is really 
about the Second Amendment,14 a claim that is difficult to reconcile with 
the fact that the passage expressly states that the Second Amendment was 
adopted to protect the state militias. 
I. NEW ORIGINALISM VS. BLACKSTONIANISM: ORIGINAL MEANING 
OR ORIGINAL INTENT 
To understand Hardy’s interpretive error one must look at his original-
ist method.  Hardy clearly endorses Randy Barnett’s and Justice Scalia’s 
new originalism, a theory of constitutional interpretation that eschews the 
intent of the Framers and instead focuses on something called ―original 
public meaning.‖15  There are several problems with this method. First, it is 
inconsistent with the dominant modes of constitutional interpretation famil-
iar to the Founders, which were largely focused on establishing intent.16  
Second, the new method lacks any clear rules or methodology.  The Heller 
majority employed an eclectic assortment of interpretive practices from dif-
ferent moments in American history.  It is hard to see how one can claim to 
be an originalist if one rejects the Founders’ interpretive techniques and 
substitutes in their place modes of analysis developed decades after the 
adoption of the Constitution.17 
It is not surprising that new originalism has been attacked by legal 
scholars from across the contemporary political spectrum.  Conservative 
judge Richard Posner has denounced the method as a form of ―faux origi-
nalism.‖18  Posner correctly insists that a genuine originalist method must 
adhere to the Founders’ interpretive rules.  Scholars on the left have also 
faulted the Heller decision for its bizarre methodology.  For example, Reva 
Siegel notes the ―temporal oddities‖ of the opinion, which invokes the pub-
lic meaning at the time of the Founding, but relies heavily on evidence 





  Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2839 n.32. 
14
  Hardy, supra note 4, at 278.  
15
  See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999); Randy E. 
Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution Means What it Says, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008, at A13 (link). 
16
  See Saul Cornell, District of Columbia v. Heller, the New Originalism, and the Old Law Office 
History: Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss, UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming).  
17
  See Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625 (2008) (link).   
18
  Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32-33 (link). 
19
  Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism As Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. 
L. REV. 191, 196–98 (2008) (link). 
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ginalists seem unaware of, or unconcerned with, the profound changes that  
transformed American law in the period between the Founding era and the 
Jacksonian period. 
 Justice Stevens, by contrast, uses orthodox eighteenth century Black-
stonian methods.20  This approach may not meet all of the requirements of 
scholarly history, but it is a much better approximation of what originalism 
ought to look like, at least if one is interested in the constitutional ideas of 
Tucker, who clearly owed a great intellectual debt to Blackstone.21  One of 
the many problems with new originalism is that it ignores the interpretive 
pluralism of the Founding era.  There was no single originalist method fa-
vored by the Founders.  Federalists and Anti-Federalists were deeply di-
vided over interpretive methodology.22  Indeed, rather than represent a neu-
neutral method of constitutional interpretation, the best that any version of 
originalism could ever hope to achieve would be to force us to choose sides 
among the different interpretive methods favored by the Founders them-
selves.  Still, because the issue raised by Hardy’s essay is how to interpret 
Tucker, we need to use Tucker’s method, and that method was grounded in 
Blackstone. 
What does orthodox Blackstonian method entail?  Although Blacksto-
nian method may share with new originalism an interest in establishing the 
original public meaning at the time of the Founding, this type of analysis is 
merely the first step in a multistage process of interpretation.  Blackstone 
summarizes his method as follows:  
 
The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the 
legislator, is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law 
was made, by signs the most natural and probable.  And these 
signs are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the ef-
fects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law.23 
 
The Blackstonian method supports an intentionalist model, not Bar-
nett’s and Scalia’s new originalism.  Blackstone underscores the intentio-
nalist focus of this method in the last rule by noting that ―the most universal 





  On Stevens’s originalist method, see Cornell, supra note 17, at 637.  On the debate over the 
Founders’ views of originalism, see H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 
98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985) (link); Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original In-
tent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77 (1988); Jack N. Rakove, The Original Intention of Original Understand-
ing, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 159 (1996) (link); Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems With Originalism, 
31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 907 (2008) (link). 
21
  For a discussion of the limits of both the old and the new originalism, see Stephen M. Griffin, 
Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185 (link).  
22
  Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 570 (2003).  
Blackstonian method was one of several different methods embraced by the Founders.  See id. at 560. 
23
  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *59 (link). 
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to ―the reason and spirit of it; or the cause which moved the legislator to 
enact it.‖24  This rule was sometimes described by contemporaries of Tucker 
as a search for the evil to be remedied.25   
II. READING TUCKER’S LAW LECTURES FROM A BLACKSTONIAN 
PERSPECTIVE 
Taking Blackstone’s rules about the ―spirit and reason‖ of the law as a 
guide, consider the first passage discussing the Second Amendment in the 
table above.  Hardy’s claim that this passage is about the militia clauses and 
not the Second Amendment is obviously inconsistent with Blackstone’s in-
junction that the meaning of a legal and constitutional text is to be gleaned 
from the intent of its authors.  It is clear that Tucker believed that the intent 
of the First Congress in adopting the Second Amendment was to deal with 
the danger posed by Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution.  This is pre-
cisely the claim made by Stevens that Hardy criticizes.26   
Turning to the other passage that Hardy believes holds the true secret 
to Tucker’s views on the Second Amendment, Blackstonian analysis also 
reveals a very different meaning.  The passage does describe the Second 
Amendment as the ―palladium of liberty.‖  Hardy clearly believes that it is 
self-evident that this passage shows that the Second Amendment protected 
the natural right of self-defense.  Even a quick glance at the passage, how-
ever, ought to raise doubts about this reading.  If one applies Blackstone’s 
rules of interpretation to this text, it becomes clear that the passage is not 
about a private right of self-defense.  The evil Tucker identifies in the pas-
sage that needs to be remedied is exactly the same as the danger mentioned 
in the other passage from the law lectures: the threat posed by the powerful 
standing army created by the Constitution.   
Hardy’s reading of this text ignores the Blackstonian rules of construc-





  Id. at *61. 
25
  Saul Cornell, The Original Meaning Of Original Understanding: A Neo-Blackstonian Critique, 
67 MD. L. REV. 150, 152 (2007).  In a case dealing with the status of slaves in Pennsylvania after the 
states’ gradual emancipation law, for example, the state supreme court applied this rule of construction 
by interpreting the law in terms of the evil the legislature had intended to remedy.  See Respublica v. 
Richards, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 224, 226, 1 Yeates 480, 483 (Pa. 1795) (link). 
26
  See supra text accompanying note 7.  Indeed, it seems hard to reconcile Hardy’s reading of this 
text with any plausible theory of constitutional interpretation.  Moreover, this text clearly contradicts a 
central claim of gun-rights advocates that there is no contemporary evidence from the Founding era to 
support such a theory.  Gun-rights advocates have also argued that such a theory leads to absurd results, 
including the right to take up arms against the federal government.  E.g., Stephen P. Halbrook, To Keep 
and Bear Their Private Arms: The Adoption of the Second Amendment, 1787–1791, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 
13, 38 (1982) (link).  Cf. Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment and 
States’ Rights: A Thought Experiment, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1737 (1995) (describing a multitude of 
absurd consequences of a states’ rights view) (link).  Of course, this was precisely what radical Jefferso-
nians came to believe in the 1790s.  See SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING 
FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 75–85 (2006).  
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game laws.  Although it is true that the game laws had been used to effec-
tively disarm the English people, Tucker was well aware that America had 
no game laws.  Nor was Tucker worried that America would follow Eng-
land down this path.  The threat to liberty in America was different.27  
Tucker shared with Brutus, one of the most theoretically sophisticated Anti-
Federalist authors, the view that the scope of federal power was limited to 
the ―protection and defence of the community against foreign force and in-
vasion‖ and to the equally important role of suppressing ―insurrections 
among ourselves.‖28  All matters related to individual self-defense, by con-
trast, fell within the scope of state authority ―to provide for the protection 
and defence of the citizen against the hand of private violence, and the 
wrongs done or attempted by individuals to each other. . . .‖29  Tucker’s dis-
cussion of the danger posed by Federalist policy in the 1790s confirms this 
view. Tucker did not believe that disarmament would be done by English-
style game laws.  Instead, he predicted that it would be accomplished by us-
ing the government’s power to repress insurrection under Article I, Section 
8, and the treason clauses.  Rather than focus on the evil Tucker intended to 
remedy, the danger of a standing army, Hardy substitutes his own modern 
gun-rights ideology and its fears about gun control and the private right of 
self-defense.  Rather than treat Tucker as an eighteenth-century Jeffersonian 
Republican,30 Hardy casts him as an early American Charlton Heston.31   
The passage quoted by Hardy is not about private self-defense, but ra-
ther about the political danger posed by a standing army.  Tucker made this 
absolutely clear when he wrote: ―[T]he landed aristocracy have been 
brought to side with the Court in a measure evidently calculated to check 
the effect of any ferment which the measures of government may produce 
in the minds of the people.‖32  The focus of the text is not on the private use 
of arms to fend off personal attack, but instead clearly on the political use of 
arms in a collective effort to defend political liberty—a function that the 
Founders believed was best served by the ―well regulated militia‖ protected 
by the Second Amendment.  Using Blackstonian methods to interpret this 
passage leads to the same conclusion as Justice Stevens’s dissent.  The key 





  For a discussion of Federalist and Anti-Federalist views of the limited scope of federal power and 
its relevance to firearms regulation at the state level, see Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The 
Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103, 111–13 (2000) (link). 
28
  Brutus, Essays of Brutus (VII), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 400–01 (Herbert J. Stor-
ing ed., 1981). 
29
  Id. at 401. 
30
  See ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO 
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. note D at 289–300 (St. George Tucker ed., Lawbook Exchange, 
Ltd. 1996) [hereinafter TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE] (1803) (link). 
31
  On Heston and gun rights, see JOAN BURBICK, GUN SHOW NATION: GUN CULTURE AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2006). 
32
  This quotation can be found supra in Table 1.  
103:406  (2009) St. George Tucker’s Lecture Notes 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/13/ 413 
standing army.  In short, when both of these passages are read using Tuck-
er’s own Blackstonian method, it is clear that they both point in the same 
direction: the evil the Second Amendment was intended to remedy was the 
threat of a standing army, not a potential threat to the common law right of 
self-defense. 
Tucker does briefly mention that ―[t]he right of self defense is the first 
law of nature.‖33  Hardy has misinterpreted this claim as well.  The quota-
tion does not explain the meaning of the Second Amendment.  Rather, it 
simply restates a truism of eighteenth-century political and constitutional 
theory: prior to entering civil society individuals had an absolute right of 
self-defense.  Hardy fails to take note of Blackstone’s discussion of the dif-
ferent meanings of the right of self-defense in the Commentaries.  In es-
sence, Hardy conflates the natural right of self-defense, the common law 
right of self-defense, and the constitutional right to keep and bear arms.  
Most Americans in the Founding era, including Tucker, recognized that 
leaving the state of nature required trading the almost limitless natural right 
of self-defense for the far more limited common law right of self-defense.  
Here is how one eighteenth-century American writer summarized the move 
from the state of nature to civil society: 
 
1st. The power that every one has in a state of nature to do 
whatever he judgeth fit, for the preservation of his person and 
property and that of others also, within the permission of the law 
of nature, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the socie-
ty, so far forth as the preservation of himself (his person and 
property) and the rest of that society shall require.  
And 2nd. The power of punishing he wholly gives up, and 
engages his natural force (which he might before employ in the 
execution of the law of nature by his own single authority as he 
thought fit) to assist the executive power of the society as the law 
thereof shall require.34 
 
In his Commentaries, Blackstone discussed two concepts of self-
defense: the 5th Auxiliary right and the common law right of self-defense.35  
The former, a political or civic right, was embodied in the English Bill of 





  Id. 
34
  ELISHA WILLIAMS, THE ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF PROTESTANTS (1744), reprinted in 
1 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE FOUNDING ERA, 1730–1805, at 59 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1998) (emphasis in 
original).  For a similar view from the Founding era, see Essays by The Impartial Examiner No. 1 (Feb. 
20, 1788), in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 173–179 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). 
35
  1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *143–44; 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *184. 
36
  On Blackstone’s view of the difference between these rights, see Steven J. Heyman, Natural 
Rights and the Second Amendment, 76 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 237, 252–260 (2000) (link).  
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have arms suitable to their condition as allowed by law.  When the very 
same Parliament considered allowing individuals to have arms for self-
defense within their homes, they rejected this proposal.37  Given Black-
stone’s and Tucker’s strong support for the rule of in pari materia,38 and 
Tucker’s own analysis of the anemic nature of the English right to have 
arms articulated in the very same text quoted by Hardy, it seems clear that 
Tucker did not believe that the English right was very robust.   
Ironically, Hardy’s essay may well end up providing critics of Heller 
with some of their best historical ammunition.  Scalia’s decision in Heller 
rests much of its authority on the claim that the Second Amendment pro-
tected a preexisting right that the English Bill of Rights had established.39  
Yet, if one looks closely at Tucker’s discussion of the nature of that right, it 
is absolutely clear that Tucker did not see the robust right described by Sca-
lia, but rather viewed this right as almost nonexistent.  Tucker believed that 
―[i]n England the right of the people to bear arms is confined to protes-
tants—and by the terms suitable to their condition & degree, the effect of 
the Declaration is entirely done away.‖40  At a very minimum, the material 
Hardy cites in his article provides strong evidence that Tucker did not share 
Scalia’s view of the English Bill of Rights.   
Heller’s conclusion that the Second Amendment was meant to provide 
federal protection for either the natural right of self-defense or the common 
law right of self-defense rests on another misunderstanding.  The common 
law right of self-defense was distinct from and more limited than the natural 
right of self-defense.  Individuals were allowed to use deadly force if, and 
only if, retreat was impossible.  In the footnote annotations in his treatise on 
Blackstone, Tucker notes that the 5th Auxiliary right was essentially civic 
and public in character and was part of the genealogy of the Second 
Amendment.41  The annotations of the common law right of private self-
defense, by contrast, do not mention the Second Amendment, but rather cite 
to the standard English treatises on common law and crime.  Hardy’s mi-
sreading of Tucker results from his erroneous tendency to conflate and col-
lapse into a single right three very different conceptions of self-defense: the 
natural right of self-defense, the common law right of self-defense, and the 
constitutional right to keep and bear arms. 
To illustrate the differences between these different legal conceptions 





  Lois G. Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms: The English Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 27, 
51 (2000) (link).  See generally id. at 30–58 (discussing the English view on the right to bear arms).  
38
  1 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at 58 n.1 (―It is an established rule of construction that 
statutes in pari materia, or upon the same subject, must be construed with a reference to each other. . . 
.‖). 
39
  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797–98 (2008). 
40
  This quotation can be found supra in Table 1. 
41
  2 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at 143–45 nn.40–42; see Cornell, supra note 8, at 
1126. 
103:406  (2009) St. George Tucker’s Lecture Notes 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/13/ 415 
these rights were understood to legally impact men, women, and African-
American slaves in Tucker’s Virginia.  In the state of nature all of these 
groups enjoyed an absolute right to use whatever force necessary to defend 
themselves.  The common law in Virginia, as revised by statute, did not 
protect an untrammeled right of self-defense for any of these groups.  Men 
and women each enjoyed a limited right of self-defense that required them 
to retreat to the wall before responding with deadly force.  African-
American slaves had an even more limited right.  As Tucker himself noted 
regarding the situation of African Americans in his own state: ―[I]t will ap-
pear that not only the right of property, and the right of personal liberty, but 
even the right of personal security, has been, at times, either wholly annihi-
lated, or reduced to a shadow. . . .‖42  The right to bear arms in Virginia was 
also not universal: women were excluded and so were slaves.  The situation 
of free blacks was especially complicated because they occupied a hazy le-
gal netherworld between freedom and slavery.  Tucker noted that ―[f]ree 
negroes and mulattoes‖ were constitutionally prohibited from ―serving in 
the militia, except as drummers or pioneers, but now I presume they are 
enrolled in the lists of those who bear arms, though formerly punishable for 
presuming to appear at muster-field.‖43  
Tucker’s use of the term ―bear arms‖ in this context merits closer at-
tention.  In Tucker’s writing, this term was not synonymous with bearing or 
carrying a gun.  Indeed, Tucker noted the restrictions on free blacks in his 
analysis.  Under state law ―[a]ll but house-keepers, and persons residing 
upon the frontiers are prohibited from keeping, or carrying any gun, powd-
er, shot, club, or other weapon offensive or defensive. . . .‖44  There was a 
clear difference in his mind between keeping and carrying a gun and keep-
ing and bearing arms.  Tucker’s use of the term ―bear arms‖ does not lend 
much support to the notion that this term was commonly used to signify the 
use of guns in a civilian context.  Recall that according to Blackstone, 
―[w]ords are generally to be understood in their usual and most known sig-
nification; not so much regarding the propriety of grammar, as their general 
and popular use.‖45  Scalia’s opinion in Heller relies uncritically on the find-
ings of an article published in a Federalist Society-sponsored law review 
that purports to show that the term ―bear arms‖ was frequently used in a 
nonmilitary sense in the Founding era.46  Yet, if one examines the footnotes 
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from the Founding era that support this claim, and one of those refers to the 
term ―bear a gun,‖ not ―bear arms.‖47   
By contrast, historian Nathan Kozuskanich identified close to a hun-
dred examples of popular uses of the term ―bear arms‖ outside of Congress 
that support the military reading of this term.48  If Scalia had applied his 
own theory neutrally he should have concluded that the most common use 
of the term was military-related.49  Even if one accepts the flawed scholar-
ship Scalia cited, including the dubious proposition that both uses of ―bear 
arms‖ were common, then the Blackstonian method is clear on how to re-
solve the disputed meaning of the term in question: one must consult the 
preamble.50  Yet, rather than follow the Founders’ Blackstonian rule, Scalia 
opportunistically turns to a different set of rules about preambles invented 
decades after the Second Amendment was framed.51  
It is easy to see why a prominent conservative legal scholar such as 
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methodology, Heller shows that originalism has no ability to constrain 
judges.  A similar critique was framed by Richard Posner, who notes that 
Heller proves that one can use originalist methods to justify almost any 
conclusion as long as one has enough law clerks to do the research.53  In-
deed, the search for original meaning may be even more prone to manipula-
tion than the search for original intent.54  Rather than elevate the doctrine of 
originalism to a new level, history may well show that it was Scalia’s deci-
sion in Heller that finally demonstrated that the originalist emperor has no 
clothes. 
CONCLUSION 
David Hardy is to be commended for transcribing these sections of St. 
George Tucker’s law lectures and making them more widely available.  His 
interpretation of Tucker, however, is more problematic.  Tucker’s earliest 
writings on the Second Amendment support neither Hardy’s individual-
rights views of the Second Amendment nor the majority opinion in Heller.  
Tucker’s vision of the Second Amendment is not consistent with either the 
modern gun control or gun-rights view of the Second Amendment.  Tucker 
was a late eighteenth-century Jeffersonian and his views of the Second 
Amendment were crafted in response to the debates of his own day, not our 
own. 
Rather than challenge Justice Stevens’s reading of the Second 
Amendment, the passage cited by Hardy provides even more convincing 
evidence to support Stevens’s dissent in Heller. Only by ignoring the 
Founding era’s own rules of construction and employing a ―faux original-
ist‖ method can one arrive at Hardy’s view of the evidence. Indeed, the pas-
sage quoted by Hardy makes it absolutely clear that it was Justice Scalia, 
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